Defending the dynamic hypothesis

In Wolfgang Tschacher & J-P Dauwalder (eds.), Dynamics, Synergetics, Autonomous Agents: Nonlinear Systems Approaches to Cognitive Psychology and Cognitive Science. Singapore: World Scientific (1999)
Abstract
Cognitive science has always been dominated by the idea that cognition is _computational _in a rather strong and clear sense. Within the mainstream approach, cognitive agents are taken to be what are variously known as _physical symbol_ _systems, digital computers_, _syntactic engines_, or_ symbol manipulators_. Cognitive operations are taken to consist in the shuffling of symbol tokens according to strict rules (programs). Models of cognition are themselves digital computers, implemented on general purpose electronic machines. The basic mathematical framework for understanding cognition is the theory of discrete computation, and the core theoretical tools for developing and understanding models of cognition are those of computer science
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