Experience, awareness, and consciousness: Suggestions for definitions as offered by an evolutionary approach [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Foundations of Science 5 (4):429-456 (2000)
An evolutionary point of view is proposed to make more appropriate distinctions between experience, awareness and consciousness. Experience can be defined as a characteristic linked closely to specific pattern matching, a characteristic already apparent at the molecular level at least. Awareness can be regarded as the special experience of one or more central, final modules in the animal neuronal brain. Awareness is what experience is to animals.Finally, consciousness could be defined as reflexive awareness. The ability for reflexive awareness is distinctly different from animal and human awareness and depends upon the availability of a separate frame of reference, as provided by symbolic language. As such, words have made reflexive awareness
|Keywords||Awareness Consciousness Evolution Experience Science|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Greg Janzen (2006). Phenomenal Character as Implicit Self-Awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):44-73.
Robert Arp (2007). Consciousness and Awareness - Switched-on Rheostats: A Response to de Quincey. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (3):101-106.
Dan Zahavi (2000). Self and Consciousness. In , Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experience. John Benjamins. 55--74.
John Louis Schwenkler (2009). Space and Self-Awareness. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
P. Cicogna & M. Bosinelli (2001). Consciousness During Dreams. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):26-41.
Mark Rowlands (2008). From the Inside: Consciousness and the First-Person Perspective. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):281 – 297.
Mark Rowlands (2003). Consciousness: The Transcendalist Manifesto. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):205-21.
Fred Dretske (1993). Conscious Experience. Mind 102 (406):263-283.
A. Minh Nguyen (2001). A Critique of Dretske's Conception of State Consciousness. Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):187-206.
Uriah Kriegel (2004). The Functional Role of Consciousness: A Phenomenological Approach. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (2):171-93.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads61 ( #20,711 of 1,088,426 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #69,601 of 1,088,426 )
How can I increase my downloads?