Theoria 78 (2):93-114 (2011)
|Abstract||Fitch showed that not every true proposition can be known in due time; in other words, that not every proposition is knowable. Moore showed that certain propositions cannot be consistently believed. A more recent dynamic phrasing of Moore-sentences is that not all propositions are known after their announcement, i.e., not every proposition is successful. Fitch's and Moore's results are related, as they equally apply to standard notions of knowledge and belief (S 5 and KD45, respectively). If we interpret ‘successful’ as ‘known after its announcement’ and ‘knowable’ as ‘known after some announcement’, successful implies knowable. Knowable does not imply successful: there is a proposition ϕ that is not known after its announcement but there is another announcement after which ϕ is known. We show that all propositions are knowable in the more general sense that for each proposition, it can become known or its negation can become known. We can get to know whether it is true: ◊(Kϕ ∨ K¬ϕ). This result comes at a price. We cannot get to know whether the proposition was true. This restricts the philosophical relevance of interpreting ‘knowable’ as ‘known after an announcement’|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||No categories specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Elia Zardini, If Every True Proposition is Knowable, Then Every Believed (Decidable) Proposition is True, or the Incompleteness of the Intuitionistic Solution to the Paradox of Knowability.
Jason S. Baehr, A Priori and a Posteriori. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
M. Hand (2003). Knowability and Epistemic Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):216 – 228.
Greg Restall (2009). Not Every Truth Can Be Known (at Least, Not All at Once). In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
Ghislain Guigon (2009). Bringing About and Conjunction: A Reply to Bigelow on Omnificence. Analysis 69 (3):452-458.
Philippe Balbiani, Alexandru Baltag, Hans van Ditmarsch, Andreas Herzig, Tomohiro Hoshi & Tiago de Lima (2008). Knowable' as 'Known After an Announcement. Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (3):305-334.
Aviv Hoffmann (2003). A Puzzle About Truth and Singular Propositions. Mind 112 (448):635-651.
Eric Dietrich (2000). A Counterexample T o All Future Dynamic Systems Theories of Cognition. J. Of Experimental and Theoretical AI 12 (2):377-382.
Neil Tennant (2002). Victor Vanquished. Analysis 62 (2):135–142.
Edward N. Zalta (1987). On the Structural Similarities Between Worlds and Times. Philosophical Studies 51 (2):213-239.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005). Why Truthmakers. In H. Beebee & J. Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: the contemporary debate. Oxford University Press.
Manfred Müller (1991). Eine Widerlegung der Redundanztheorie der Wahrheit. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 22 (1):101-110.
Added to index2011-10-22
Total downloads3 ( #201,781 of 549,006 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,261 of 549,006 )
How can I increase my downloads?