Functionalism as a theory of mind

Philosophy Research Archives 185:185-204 (1982)
Abstract
A general characterization of functionalist theories of mind is offered and a number of issues are discussed which allow for alternative versions of functionalism. Some issues, such as the distinction between the implicit definition and partial specification views are of a general nature, while others raise questions more specific to functionalism, such as whether the relation between psychological and physiological properties is one of identity or instantiation. Section II attempts to undermine several arguments which have been offered to support the non-identity position. In the final section, the suggestions that the relevant notions of functional equivalence might be unpacked solely in terms of abstract automata features or entirely in terms of causal relations to nonintentionally characterized behavior are shown to be inadequate
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 12,738
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

1 ( #484,330 of 1,413,435 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #154,636 of 1,413,435 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.