From Vicious Circle to Infinite Regress, and Back Again

The attempt to formulate a viable empiricist and non-foundationalist epistemology of science faces four problems here confronted. The first is an apparent loss of objectivity in science, in the conditions of use of models in applied science. The second derives from the theory-infection of scientific language, with an apparent loss of objective conditions of truth and reference. The third, often cited as objection to The Scientific Image, is the apparent theory-dependence of the distinction between what is and is not observable. The fourth and last is the loss of the possibility of objective evaluation of rationality in scientific methodology. It is argued that each of these problems is illusory
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O. Bueno (1997). Empirical Adequacy: A Partial Structures Approach. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (4):585-610.

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Bas C. Van Fraassen (1992). From Vicious Circle to Infinite Regress, and Back Again. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:6 - 29.
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