Games in Dynamic-Epistemic Logic

Abstract
We discuss games of both perfect and imperfect information at two levels of structural detail: players’ local actions, and their global powers for determining outcomes of the game. We propose matching logical languages for both. In particular, at the ‘action level’, imperfect information games naturally model a combined ‘dynamic-epistemic language’ – and we find correspondences between special axioms and particular modes of playing games with their information dynamics. At the ‘outcome level’, we present suitable notions of game equivalence, plus some simple representation results.
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Melvin Fitting (2011). Reasoning About Games. Studia Logica 99 (1-3):143-169.

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