Journal of Philosophy 108 (2):55-77 (2011)
|Abstract||Imaginative representations are crucial to the generation of action--both pretense and plain action. But well-known theories of imagination on offer in the literature  fail to describe how perceptually-formatted imaginings (mental images) and motor imaginings function in the generation of action and  fail to recognize the important fact that spatially rich imagining can be integrated into one's perceptual manifold. In this paper, I present a theory of imagining that shows how spatially rich imagining functions in the generation of action. I also describe the imaginative structures behind two under-explored forms of action: semi-pretense and pretense layering. In addition, I suggest that my theory of imagining meshes better than the competitors with current work in cognitive and affective neuroscience.|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Shaun Nichols (2004). Imagining and Believing: The Promise of a Single Code. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62 (2):129-39.
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2006). Imaginative Contagion. Metaphilosophy 37 (2):183-203.
Peter Langland-Hassan (2012). Pretense, Imagination, and Belief: The Single Attitude Theory. Philosophical Studies 159 (2):155-179.
Shen-yi Liao & Tamar Szabó Gendler (2011). Pretense and Imagination. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews 2 (1):79-94.
Dustin R. Stokes (2006). The Evaluative Character of Imaginative Resistance. British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (4):287-405.
Shaun Nichols (2006). Just the Imagination: Why Imagining Doesn't Behave Like Believing. Mind and Language 21 (4):459–474.
Neil Van Leeuwen (2013). The Meanings of "Imagine" Part I: Constructive Imagination. Philosophy Compass 8 (3):220-230.
Eric Funkhouser & Shannon Spaulding (2009). Imagination and Other Scripts. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):291-314.
Added to index2010-05-18
Total downloads291 ( #675 of 722,929 )
Recent downloads (6 months)68 ( #622 of 722,929 )
How can I increase my downloads?