It Is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, for Anyone, to Believe Anything upon Insufficient Evidence

In Jeff Jordan & Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.), Faith, Freedom and Rationality. Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield 137-154 (1996)
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Roger White (2005). Epistemic Permissiveness. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.
William Lycan (2009). Giving Dualism its Due. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.
Bryan Frances (2010). The Reflective Epistemic Renegade. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):419 - 463.
Richard Feldman (2005). Respecting the Evidence. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):95–119.

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Peter van Inwagen (1988). On Always Being Wrong. In Peter French, Theodore Uehling & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Realism and Anti-Realism. University of Minnesota Press 95--111.
Peter Van Inwagen (1987). Without Proof or Evidence. Faith and Philosophy 4 (1):103-108.

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