Identity-Based Reduction and Reductive Explanation

Philosophia Naturalis 47 (1-2):183-219 (2010)
In this paper, the relation between identity-based reduction and one specific sort of reductive explanation is considered. The notion of identity-based reduction is spelled out and its role in the reduction debate is sketched. An argument offered by Jaegwon Kim, which is supposed to show that identity-based reduction and reductive explanation are incompatible, is critically examined. From the discussion of this argument, some important consequences about the notion of reduction are pointed out.
Keywords Reductive Explanation  Bridge Laws  Theory Reduction  Explanation
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DOI 10.3196/003180211796334138
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