Kant on the Nominal Definition of Truth
Kant-Studien 101 (2):147-166 (2010)
| Abstract | Kant claims that the nominal definition of truth is: “Truth is the agreement of cognition with its object”. In this paper, I analyse the relevant features of Kant's theory of definition in order to explain the meaning of that claim and its consequences for the vexed question of whether Kant endorses or rejects a correspondence theory of truth. I conclude that Kant's claim implies neither that he holds, nor that he rejects, a correspondence theory of truth. Kant's claim is not a generic way of setting aside a correspondence definition of truth, or of considering it uninformative. Being the nominal definition of truth, the formula “truth is the agreement of cognition with its object” illustrates the meaning of the predicate “is true” and people's ordinary conception of truth. True judgements correspond to the objects they are about. However, there could be more to the property of truth than correspondence | |||||||||
| Keywords | Kant truth definitions | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. Try with proxy. Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesDavid Holdcroft (1981). Bradley and the Impossibility of Absolute Truth. History and Philosophy of Logic 2 (1-2):25-39.
Jaakko Hintikka (2000). What Is True and False About So-Called Theories of Truth? The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:155-160.
Stewart Candlish, The Identity Theory of Truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Timothy Rosenkoetter (2009). Truth Criteria and the Very Project of a Transcendental Logic. Archiv für Geschichte Der Philosophie 91 (2):193-236.
Chong-Hyon Paek (2005). Kant’s Theory of Transcendental Truth as Ontology. Kant-Studien 96 (2):147-160.
Mark A. Wrathall (1999). Heidegger and Truth as Correspondence. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (1):69 – 88.
Luis Fernández Moreno (2001). Tarskian Truth and the Correspondence Theory. Synthese 126 (1-2):123 - 147.
Alberto Vanzo (2010). Kant, Skepticism, and the Comparison Argument. In Pablo Muchnick (ed.), Rethinking Kant, vol. 2. Cambridge Scholars Publishers.
Alberto Vanzo (2012). Kant on Truth-Aptness. History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (2):109-126.
Alberto Vanzo (2008). A Correspondence Theory of Objects? On Kant's Notions of Truth, Object, and Actuality. History of Philosophy Quarterly 25:259-275.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2010-06-25Total downloads87 ( #8,303 of 549,124 )Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #6,081 of 549,124 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
