David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (2):109-126 (2012)
Many scholars claimed that, according to Immanuel Kant, some judgements lack a truth-value: analytic judgements, judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience, judgements of perception, and non-assertoric judgements. However, no one has undertaken an extensive examination of the textual evidence for those claims. Based on an analysis of Kant's texts, I argue that: (1) according to Kant, only judgements of perception are not truth-apt. All other judgements are truth-apt, including analytic judgements and judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience. (2) Kant sometimes states that truth-apt judgements are actual bearers of truth or falsity only when they are taken to state what is actually the case. Kant calls these judgements assertoric. Other texts ascribe truth and falsity to judgements, regardless of whether they are assertoric. Kant's views on truth-aptness raise challenges for correspondentist and coherentist interpretations of Kant's theory of truth; they rule out the identification of Kant's crucial notion of objective validity with truth-aptness; and they imply that Kant was not a verificationist about truth or meaning.
|Keywords||truth truth-aptness truth-bearers judgments|
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References found in this work BETA
Hilary Putnam (1981). Reason, Truth, and History. Cambridge University Press.
Henry E. Allison (2004). Kant's Transcendental Idealism. Yale University Press.
Béatrice Longuenesse (1998). Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the "Critique of Pure Reason". Princeton University Press.
Barry Stroud (1984). The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford University Press.
James Van Cleve (1999). Problems From Kant. Oxford University Press.
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