Let's dance! The equivocation in Chalmers' dancing qualia argument

Minds and Machines 8 (2):237-249 (1998)
David Chalmers' dancing qualia argument is intended to show that phenomenal experiences, or qualia, are organizational invariants. The dancing qualia argument is a reductio ad absurdum, attempting to demonstrate that holding an alternative position, such as the famous inverted spectrum argument, leads one to an implausible position about the relation between consciousness and cognition. In this paper, we argue that Chalmers' dancing qualia argument fails to establish the plausibility of qualia being organizational invariants. Even stronger, we will argue that the gap in the argument cannot be closed
Keywords Argument  Artificial  Consciousness  Qualia  Science  Chalmers, D
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DOI 10.1023/A:1008273402702
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PhilPapers Archive B. van Heuveln, Let's dance! The equivocation in Chalmers' dancing qualia argument
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David Gamez (2009). The Potential for Consciousness of Artificial Systems. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (02):213-223.

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