David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In this paper we forge a connection between dynamic epistemic logics of belief revision on one hand and studies of collective judgement and multi-agent preference change on the other. Belief revision in the spirit of dynamic epistemic logic uses updating with relational substitutions to change the beliefs of individual agents. Collective judgement in social choice theory studies the collective outcomes of individual belief changes. We start out from the logic of communication and change (LCC), which is basically epistemic propositional dynamic logic (PDL) extended with update action modalities. We show how epistemic PDL can be made to handle belief operators. Our new version of epistemic/doxastic PDL does not impose any constraints on the basic relations. Because of this it does not suffer from the drawback of LCC that constraints on epistemic relations, such as transitivity and reflexivity, may get lost under updates that are admitted by the system. After introducing the base system without constraints, we study the effects of imposing a single constraint, namely the constraint that the agent’s preference relations are linked. Linkedness is a natural extension of local connectedness to the multi-agent case. It assures that if Alice prefers y to x and Bob prefers z to x, then both Alice and Bob can make up their minds when given a choice between y and z. Since general belief changes may not preserve linkedness, we propose a recipe for belief change that does preserve it. Finally, we show that the resulting framework can be used to model consensus seeking procedures. We focus on the case of plenary Dutch meetings. In Dutch meetings, a belief change (or rather: preference change) is performed for all agents in the meeting if a majority believes (or: is in favour of) the proposition that is under discussion. A special case of these meetings is judgement aggregation, and we apply our framework to the discursive dilemma in..
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