David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In  it is shown how propositional dynamic logic (PDL) can be interpreted as a logic of belief revision that extends the logic of communication and change (LCC) given in . This new version of epistemic/doxastic PDL does not impose any constraints on the basic relations and because of this it does not suffer from the drawback of LCC that these constraints may get lost under updates that are admitted by the system. Here, we will impose one constraint, namely that the agent’s plausibility relations are linked. Linkedness is a natural extension of local connectedness to the multi-agent case and it assures that we know the agent’s preferences between all relevant alternatives. Since the belief updates that are used in  may not preserve linkedness, we limit ourselves to a particular kind of belief change that does preserve it. Our framework has obvious connections to coalition logic  and social choice theory . We show how we can use it to model consensus seeking in plenary Dutch meetings. In Dutch meetings, a belief update is done for all agents in the meeting if a majority beliefs the proposition that is under discussion. A special case of these meetings is judgement aggregation, and we apply our framework to the discursive dilemma in this field 
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