David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 9:288-30 (1994)
In 1988 Fodor and Pylyshyn issued a challenge to the newly-popular connectionism: explain the systematicity of cognition without merely implementing a so-called classical architecture. Since that time quite a number of connectionist models have been put forward, either by their designers or by others, as in some measure demonstrating that the challenge can be met (e.g., Pollack, 1988, 1990; Smolensky, 1990; Chalmers, 1990; Niklasson and Sharkey, 1992; Brousse, 1993). Unfortu- nately, it has generally been unclear whether these models actually do have this implication (see, for instance, the extensive philosophical debate in Smolensky, 1988; Fodor and McLaughlin, 1990; van Gelder, 1990, 1991; McLaughlin, 1993a, 1993b; Clark, 1993). Indeed, we know of no major supporter of classical orthodoxy who has felt compelled, by connectionist models and argu- ments, to concede in print that connectionists have in fact delivered a non-classical explanation of systematicity
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