Objective Consequentialism and Avoidable Imperfections

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (Browse Results) (forthcoming)
Abstract Abstract   There are two distinct views on how to formulate an objective consequentialist account of the deontic status of actions, actualism and possibilism. On an actualist account, what matters to the deontic status of actions is only the value of the outcome an action would have, if performed. By contrast, a possibilist account also takes into account the value of the outcomes that an action could have. These two views come apart in their deontic verdicts when an agent is imperfect in an avoidable way, viz., when agent brings about less good than she could. In this paper, I offer an argument against actualism that draws on the connection between moral obligation and practical reasons. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-12 DOI 10.1007/s10677-012-9362-7 Authors Rob van Someren Greve, Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, Oude Turfmarkt 141-147, 1012 GC Amsterdam, The Netherlands Journal Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Online ISSN 1572-8447 Print ISSN 1386-2820
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