Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):974-974 (1999)
|Abstract||The isomorphism constraint places plausible limits on the use of third-person evidence to explain color experience but poses no difficulty for functionalists; they themselves argue for just such limits. Palmer's absent qualia claim is supported by neither the Color Machine nor Color Room examples. The nature of color experience depends on relations external to the color space, as well as internal to it.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Robert van Gulick (1993). Understanding the Phenomenal Mind: Are We All Just Armadillos? In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell.
Mohan Matthen (2010). Color Experience: A Semantic Theory. In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. MIT Press.
Austen Clark (1985). Qualia and the Psychophysical Explanation of Color Perception. Synthese 65 (December):377-405.
Edward Averill (2012). The Phenomenological Character of Color Perception. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):27-45.
Ned Block (1980). Are Absent Qualia Impossible? Philosophical Review 89 (2):257-74.
Gilbert Harman (1996). Qualia and Color Concepts. Philosophical Issues 7:75-79.
Stephen Palmer (1999). Color, Consciousness, and the Isomorphism Constraint. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):923-943.
Sydney Shoemaker (1975). Functionalism and Qualia. Philosophical Studies 27 (May):291-315.
Joseph Levine (1988). Absent and Inverted Qualia Revisited. Mind and Language 3 (4):271-87.
Stephen E. Palmer (1999). On Qualia, Relations, and Structure in Color Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):976-985.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads19 ( #65,278 of 556,803 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?