Out of sight but not out of mind: Isomorphism and absent qualia

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):974-974 (1999)
Abstract The isomorphism constraint places plausible limits on the use of third-person evidence to explain color experience but poses no difficulty for functionalists; they themselves argue for just such limits. Palmer's absent qualia claim is supported by neither the Color Machine nor Color Room examples. The nature of color experience depends on relations external to the color space, as well as internal to it.
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