David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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This paper shows how propositional dynamic logic (PDL) can be interpreted as a logic for multi-agent belief revision. For that we revise and extend the logic of communication and change (LCC) of . Like LCC, our logic uses PDL as a base epistemic language. Unlike LCC, we start out from agent plausibilities, add their converses, and build knowledge and belief operators from these with the PDL constructs. We extend the update mechanism of LCC to an update mechanism that handles belief change as relation substitution, and we show that the update part of this logic is more expressive than either that of LCC or that of doxastic/epistemic PDL with a belief change modality. It is shown that the properties of knowledge and belief are preserved under any update, and that the logic is complete.
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Citations of this work BETA
Patrick Allo (2013). The Many Faces of Closure and Introspection. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):91-124.
Jan van Eijck (2010). The Language of Social Software. Synthese 177 (1):77-96.
Jan van Eijck (2010). The Language of Social Software. Synthese 177 (S1):77 - 96.
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