David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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This talk shows how propositional dynamic logic (PDL) can be interpreted as a logic for multi-agent knowledge update and belief revision, or as a logic of preference change, if the basic relations are read as preferences instead of plausibilities. Our point of departure is the logic of communication and change (LCC) of . Like LCC, our logic uses PDL as a base epistemic language. Unlike LCC, we start out from agent plausibilities, add their converses, and build knowledge and belief operators from these with the PDL constructs. We extend the update mechanism of LCC to an update mechanism that handles belief change as relation substitution, and we show that the update part of this logic is more expressive than either that of LCC or that of epistemic/doxastic PDL with a belief change modality. Next, we show that the properties of knowledge and belief are preserved under any update, unlike in LCC. We prove completeness of the logic and give examples of its use. If there is time, we will also look at the preference interpretation of the system, and at preference change scenarios that can be modelled with it.
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