Questions for the dynamicist: The use of dynamical systems theory in the philosophy of cognition [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Minds and Machines 15 (3-4):271-333 (2005)
The concepts and powerful mathematical tools of Dynamical Systems Theory (DST) yield illuminating methods of studying cognitive processes, and are even claimed by some to enable us to bridge the notorious explanatory gap separating mind and matter. This article includes an analysis of some of the conceptual and empirical progress Dynamical Systems Theory is claimed to accomodate. While sympathetic to the dynamicist program in principle, this article will attempt to formulate a series of problems the proponents of the approach in question will need to face if they wish to prolong their optimism. The main points to be addressed involve the reductive tendencies inherent in Dynamical Systems Theory, its somewhat muddled position relative to connectionism, the metaphorical nature DST-C exhibits which hinders its explanatory potential, and DST-C's problematic account of causality. Brief discussions of the mathematical and philosophical backgrounds of DST, seminal experimental work and possible adaptations of the theory or alternative suggestions (dynamicist connectionism, neurophenomenology, R&D theory) are included
|Keywords||Chaos Theory Cognition Dynamics Science Systems Theory|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
W. Schonbein (2005). Cognition and the Power of Continuous Dynamical Systems. Minds and Machines 15 (1):57-71.
Yvon Gauthier (2009). The Construction of Chaos Theory. Foundations of Science 14 (3):153-165.
William P. Bechtel (1998). Representations and Cognitive Explanations: Assessing the Dynamicist Challenge in Cognitive Science. Cognitive Science 22 (3):295-317.
Tjeerd Van De Laar (2006). Dynamical Systems Theory as an Approach to Mental Causation. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (2):307 - 332.
Matthew Botvinick (2012). Commentary: Why I Am Not a Dynamicist. Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (1):78-83.
Chris Eliasmith (1996). The Third Contender: A Critical Examination of the Dynamicist Theory of Cognition. Philosophical Psychology 9 (4):441-63.
Carlos Zednik (2011). The Nature of Dynamical Explanation. Philosophy of Science 78 (2):238-263.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads27 ( #53,391 of 1,008,710 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,702 of 1,008,710 )
How can I increase my downloads?