Rational belief and probability kinematics

Philosophy of Science 47 (2):165-187 (1980)
Abstract
A general form is proposed for epistemological theories, the relevant factors being: the family of epistemic judgments, the epistemic state, the epistemic commitment , and the family of possible epistemic inputs . First a simple theory is examined in which the states are probability functions, and the subject of probability kinematics introduced by Richard Jeffrey is explored. Then a second theory is examined in which the state has as constituents a body of information and a recipe that determines the accepted epistemic judgments on the basis of this corpus. Through an examination of several approaches to the statistical syllogism, a relation is again established with Jeffrey's generalized conditionalization
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Lyle Zynda (2006). Radical Probabilism Revisited. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):969-980.
Lyle Zynda (2006). Radical Probabilism Revisited. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):969-980.

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