David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 71 (5):794-804 (2004)
Criteria of adequacy for scientific representation of the phenomena pertain to accuracy and truth. But that representation is selective and may require distortion even in the selected parameters; this point is intimately connected with the fact that representation is intentional, and its adequacy relative to its particular purpose. Since observation and measurement are perspectival and the appearances to be saved are perspectival measurement outcomes, the question whether this “saving” is an explanatory relation provides a new focus for the realist/antirealist debate. The Born rule and von Neumann's “collapse” postulate in quantum mechanics provide a telling case for this question in recent physics.
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Stephen M. Downes (2009). Models, Pictures, and Unified Accounts of Representation: Lessons From Aesthetics for Philosophy of Science. Perspectives on Science 17 (4):417-428.
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Mohd Hazim Shah bin Abdul Murad (2011). Models, Scientific Realism, the Intelligibility of Nature, and Their Cultural Significance. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (2):253-261.
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