Science as representation: Flouting the criteria

Philosophy of Science 71 (5):794-804 (2004)
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Abstract

Criteria of adequacy for scientific representation of the phenomena pertain to accuracy and truth. But that representation is selective and may require distortion even in the selected parameters; this point is intimately connected with the fact that representation is intentional, and its adequacy relative to its particular purpose. Since observation and measurement are perspectival and the appearances to be saved are perspectival measurement outcomes, the question whether this “saving” is an explanatory relation provides a new focus for the realist/antirealist debate. The Born rule and von Neumann's “collapse” postulate in quantum mechanics provide a telling case for this question in recent physics.

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Bas C. Van Fraassen
San Francisco State University

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References found in this work

Interpreting the Quantum World.Jeffrey Bub - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (4):637-641.
Understanding Pictures.Domenic Lopes - 2000 - Mind 109 (433):158-162.
Does the Bohm theory solve the measurement problem?Abraham D. Stone - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (2):250-266.

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