Signalling games select horn strategies

Linguistics and Philosophy 27 (4):493-527 (2004)
In this paper I will discuss why (un) marked expressionstypically get an (un)marked interpretation: Horn''sdivision of pragmatic labor. It is argued that it is aconventional fact that we use language this way.This convention will be explained in terms ofthe equilibria of signalling games introduced byLewis (1969), but now in an evolutionary setting. Iwill also relate this signalling game analysis withParikh''s (1991, 2000, 2001) game-theoretical analysis ofsuccessful communication, which in turn is compared withBlutner''s: 2000) bi-directional optimality theory.
Keywords Linguistics   Philosophy of Language   Artificial Intelligence   Computational Linguistics   Semantics   Syntax
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DOI 10.1023/B:LING.0000024403.88733.3f
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Kris de Jaegher (2008). The Evolution of Horn's Rule. Journal of Economic Methodology 15 (3):275-284.
Robert van Rooij (2008). Games and Quantity Implicatures. Journal of Economic Methodology 15 (3):261-274.

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