The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):615-28 (1998)
The dynamical hypothesis is the claim that cognitive agents are dynamical systems. It stands opposed to the dominant computational hypothesis, the claim that cognitive agents are digital computers. This target article articulates the dynamical hypothesis and defends it as an open empirical alternative to the computational hypothesis. Carrying out these objectives requires extensive clarification of the conceptual terrain, with particular focus on the relation of dynamical systems to computers
Keywords cognition   computability   computational systems   computers   dynamical systems   modeling   systems   time
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X98001733
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William Bechtel (forthcoming). Can Mechanistic Explanation Be Reconciled with Scale-Free Constitution and Dynamics? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences.

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