The Dependence of Libertarianism On

Critical Review 21 (1):117-124 (2009)
G. E. Morton’s attempt to defend libertarianism against my claim that it relies on an implausible secularization of ideas of divine sovereignty fails. It is not true that morality itself entails human sovereignty, as witnessed by the moral theories of theological voluntarists and of consequentialists. Nor is it true that sovereignty can be conceptually transferred from God to equal human individuals, since they would have no legitimate way to legislate over each other short of a unanimous “general will.” Nor, finally, does the idea of first possession rescue libertarian philosophy, since it is as applicable to animals and children as to adult human beings.
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