The incompatibility of free will and determinism
Philosophical Studies 27 (March):185-99 (1975)
| Abstract | In this paper I shall define a thesis I shall call 'determinism', and argue that it is incompatible with the thesis that we are able to act otherwise than we do (i.e., is incompatible with 'free will'). Other theses, some of them very different from what I shall call 'determinism', have at least an equal right to this name, and, therefore, I do not claim to show that every thesis that could be called 'determinism' without historical impropriety is incompatible with free will. I shall, however, assume without argument that what I call 'determinism' is legitimately so called. In Part I, I shall explain what I mean by 'determinism'. In Part II, I shall make some remarks about 'can'. In Part III, I shall argue that free will and determinism are incompatible. In Part IV, I shall examine some possible objections to the argument of Part III. I shall not attempt to establish the truth or falsity of determinism, or the existence or nonexistence of free will. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Determinism Ethics Free Will Power | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,705 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesTamler Sommers (2007). The Illusion of Freedom Evolves. In Don Ross, David Spurrett, Harold Kincaid & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual volition and social context. MIT Press.
C. Taylor & Daniel C. Dennett (2002). Who's Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking Causes and Possibilities. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Shaun Nichols (2008). Great Philosophical Debates. Teaching Co..
Noa Latham (2004). Determinism, Randomness, and Value. Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):153-167.
Göran Duus-Otterström (2008). Betting Against Hard Determinism. Res Publica 14 (3).
Lynne Rudder Baker (2008). The Irrelevance of the Consequence Argument. Analysis 68 (297):13–22.
Kadri Vihvelin, Arguments for Incompatibilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Peter van Inwagen (1983). An Essay on Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Peter van Inwagen (2000). Free Will Remains a Mystery. Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads304 ( #415 of 549,128 )Recent downloads (6 months)18 ( #3,362 of 549,128 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
