David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219 - 246 (2009)
This paper claims that the standard characterization of the motivational role of belief should be supplemented. Beliefs do not only, jointly with desires, cause and rationalize actions that will satisfy the desires, if the beliefs are true; beliefs are also the practical ground of other cognitive attitudes, like imagining, which means beliefs determine whether and when one acts with those other attitudes as the cognitive inputs into choices and practical reasoning. In addition to arguing for this thesis, I take issue with Velleman's argument that belief and imagining cannot be distinguished on the basis of motivational role.
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Michael E. Bratman (1992). Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context. Mind 101 (401):1-16.
Gregory Currie & Ian Ravenscroft (2002). Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press.
Martin Davies & Max Coltheart (2000). Pathologies of Belief. Mind and Language 15:1-46.
Harry G. Frankfurt (1988). The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge University Press.
Ori Friedman & Alan M. Leslie (2007). The Conceptual Underpinnings of Pretense: Pretending is Not 'Behaving-as-If'. Cognition 105 (1):103-124.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Inga Nayding (2011). Conceptual Evidentialism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):39-65.
G. F. Schueler (1995). Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action. MIT Press.
Shaun Nichols (2006). Just the Imagination: Why Imagining Doesn't Behave Like Believing. Mind and Language 21 (4):459–474.
Danielle Bromwich (2010). Clearing Conceptual Space for Cognitivist Motivational Internalism. Philosophical Studies 148 (3):343 - 367.
Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2006). Motivational Cognitivism and the Argument From Direction of Fit. Philosophical Studies 127 (3):561 - 580.
Alfred R. Mele (1994). Self-Control and Belief. Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):419 – 435.
Lucy O'Brien (2005). Imagination and the Motivational View of Belief. Analysis 65 (1):55--62.
Lucy F. O'Brien (2005). Imagination and the Motivational Role of Belief. Analysis 65 (285):55-62.
Neil Van Leeuwen (2007). The Product of Self-Deception. Erkenntnis 67 (3):419 - 437.
Added to index2010-04-23
Total downloads195 ( #4,156 of 1,679,349 )
Recent downloads (6 months)32 ( #5,765 of 1,679,349 )
How can I increase my downloads?