Graduate studies at Western
Metaphilosophy 37 (2):162-182 (2006)
|Abstract||Two notable thought experiments are discussed in this article: Reid's thought experiment about whether a being supplied with tactile sensations alone could acquire the conception of extension and Strawson's thought experiment about whether a being supplied with auditory sensations alone could acquire the conception of mind-independent objects. The experiments are considered alongside Campbell's argument that only on the so-called relational view of experience is it possible for experiences to make available to their subjects the concept of mind-independent objects. I consider how the three issues ought to be construed as raising questions about woulds, coulds, or shoulds.|
|Keywords||Experience Metaphysics Thought Experiment Campbell, John Reid, Thomas Strawson, Peter Frederick|
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