Online research in philosophy

In this article it is intended a closer look at the renormalization procedure used in quantum electrodynamics to cope with the divergent integrals that appear in higher-order calculations within the theory. The main focus will be the charge renormalization that reveals, in a clearer way than the mass renormalization, structural limitations present in quantum electrodynamics that are even more aggravating than the ones usually pointed at when considering the renormalization procedure. In this way we see that the possibility of charge renormalization is due to limitations of the theory in the temporal description of the interactions.

I offer some brief remarks in reply to comments and criticisms of my earlier work on logical consequence and logical constants. I concentrate on criticisms, especially García-Carpintero’s charge that myviews make no room for modal intuitions about logical consequence, and Sher’s attempted rebuttal of my critique of her theory of logical constants. I show that García-Carpintero’s charge is based on misunderstandings, and that Sher’s attempted rebuttal actually reveals new problems for her theory.

The ongoing ‘enhancement’ debate pits critics of new self-shaping technologies against enthusiasts. One important thread of that debate concerns medicalization, the process whereby ‘non-medical’ problems become framed as ‘medical’ problems.In this paper I consider the charge of medicalization, which critics often level at new forms of technological self-shaping, and explain how that charge can illuminate – and obfuscate. Then, more briefly, I examine the charge of pharmacological Calvinism, which enthusiasts, in their support of technological self-shaping, often level at critics. And I suggest how that charge, too, can illuminate and obfuscate.Exploring the broad charge of medicalization and the narrower counter charge of pharmacological Calvinism leads me to conclude that, as satisfying as it can be to level one of those charges at our intellectual opponents, and as tempting as it is to lie down and rest with our favorite insight, we need to gather the energy to have a conversation about the difference between good and bad forms of medicalization. Specifically, I suggest that if we consider the ‘medicalization of love,’ we can see why critics of and enthusiasts about technological self-shaping should want (and in some cases have already begun) to distinguish between good and bad forms of such medicalization.

Traditional Marxists hold that capitalist modes of production are unjustly exploitative. In 'Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality' G. A. Cohen argues that this ``exploitation charge'' commits traditional Marxists to the thesis that people own themselves (``self-ownership''). If so, then traditional Marxism is vulnerable to a libertarian challenge to its commitment to equality. Cohen, therefore, recommends that Marxists abandon the exploitation charge. This paper undermines Cohen's case for the alleged link between the exploitation charge and self-ownership primarily by defending an account of the exploitation charge that does not involve self-ownership or compromise the Marxist commitment to equality.

In 1918, Emmy Noether published a (now famous) theorem establishing a general connection between continuous 'global' symmetries and conserved quantities. In fact, Noether's paper contains two theorems, and the second of these deals with 'local' symmetries; prima facie, this second theorem has nothing to do with conserved quantities. In the same year, Hermann Weyl independently made the first attempt to derive conservation of electric charge from a postulated gauge symmetry. In the light of Noether's work, it is puzzling that Weyl's argument uses local gauge symmetry. This paper explores the relationships between Weyl's work, Noether's two theorems, and the modern connection between gauge symmetry and conservation of electric charge. This includes showing that Weyl's connection is essentially an application of Noether's second theorem, with a novel twist.

This paper attempts to explain the abiding appeal of the suspicion that Wittgenstein is a conservative thinker. Among Wittgensteinians, there is a growing orthodoxy which takes the notion of 'Wittgenstein's conservatism' to be 'nutty' (Diamond 1991 p34). One justification for this opinion is that the charge of conservatism has typically been defended on the basis of highly implausible interpretations of Wittgenstein. However, the critical core of the conservatism charge has been mislocated by Wittgenstein's supporters and by most of his critics. No conservative theses are defended in his work. But in challenging the conceptual tools so often used in justifying criticism of our practices, Wittgenstein appears to abandon us to a conservatism BY DEFAULT. To understand this charge, we must broaden the context within which Wittgenstein's work is normally discussed. Odd as it may sound, what Wittgenstein ACTUALLY SAYS may only be one (and perhaps not the most important) consideration that we must bear in mind in assessing whether he is a conservative thinker.

In this note I examine some implications of stochastic interpretations of quantum mechanics for the concept of "charge without charge" presented by Wheeler and Misner. I argue that if a stochastic interpretation of quantum mechanics were correct, then certain shortcomings of the "charge without charge" concept could be overcome.

Several decades ago, Wheeler and Misner presented a model of electric charge ("charge without charge") based on the topological trapping of electric field lines in wormholes. In this paper, which does not argue for or against the "charge without charge" concept, I describe some generalizations of this model which might serve as topological analogs of color charges and electroweak charges.