|Abstract||We contrast Bonanno’s ‘Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework’  with preference change and belief revision from the perspective of dynamic epistemic logic (DEL). For that, we extend the logic of communication and change of  with relational substitutions  for preference change, and show that this does not alter its properties. Next we move to a more constrained context where belief and knowledge can be defined from preferences [29; 14; 5; 7], prove completeness of a very expressive logic of belief revision, and define a mechanism for updating belief revision models using a combination of action priority update  and preference substitution .|
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