|Abstract||On a rather popular conception, the paradox of analysis suggests that the intersubstitutivity of analysans and analysandum should be restricted to non-psychological contexts. This is typically taken to be compatible with the idea that two sentences differing only in that one has the analysandum where the other has the analysans express exactly the same proposition. In this note we argue that this should be pondered upon in light of the view that many important ordinary concepts are circular. In particular, we submit that if there are correct analyses grounding circular definitions, then we are bound to further restrict the substitutivity principle, for we must admit that it might fail even in non- psychological contexts.|
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