David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Dialectica 59 (4):485–498 (2005)
The so-called "argument from vagueness", the clearest formulation of which is to be found in Ted Sider’s book Four-dimensionalism, is arguably the most powerful and innovative argument recently offered in support of the view that objects are four-dimensional perdurants. The argument is defective--I submit--and in a number of ways that is worth looking into. But each "defect" corresponds to a model of change that is independently problematic and that can hardly be built into the common-sense picture of the world. So once all the gaps of the argument are filled in, the three-dimensionalist is left with the burden of a response that cannot rely on a passive plea for common sense. The argument is not a threat to common sense as such; it is a threat to the three-dimensionalist faithfulness to common sense.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Timothy Williamson (1994). Vagueness. Routledge.
Theodore Sider (2001). Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford University Press.
David Lewis (1991). Parts of Classes. Blackwell.
Roy A. Sorensen (1988). Blindspots. Oxford University Press.
David Wiggins (1980). Sameness and Substance. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Chad Carmichael (2015). Toward a Commonsense Answer to the Special Composition Question. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):475-490.
Daniel Z. Korman (2010). The Argument From Vagueness. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):891-901.
Daniel Z. Korman (2007). Unrestricted Composition and Restricted Quantification. Philosophical Studies 140 (3):319-334.
David Liebesman & Matti Eklund (2007). Sider on Existence. Noûs 41 (3):519–528.
Pablo Rychter (2009). There is No Puzzle About Change. Dialectica 63 (1):7-22.
Similar books and articles
Yuri Balashov (2005). On Vagueness, 4d and Diachronic Universalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):523 – 531.
Andrew Wake (2011). Spacetime and Mereology. Erkenntnis 74 (1):17-35.
Ryan Wasserman, John Hawthorne & Mark Scala (2004). Recombination, Causal Constraints, and Humean Supervenience: An Argument for Temporal Parts? In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. OUP Oxford
Mark Moyer (2009). Does Four-Dimensionalism Explain Coincidence?∗. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):479-488.
Theodore Sider (1997). Four-Dimensionalism. Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.
Berit Brogaard (2000). Presentist Four-Dimensionalism. The Monist 83 (3):341-356.
Nikk Effingham (2009). Universalism, Vagueness and Supersubstantivalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):35 – 42.
Jack Copeland, Heather Dyke & Diane Proudfoot (2001). Temporal Parts and Their Individuation. Analysis 61 (4):289–293.
Trenton Merricks (2005). Composition and Vagueness. Mind 114 (455):615-637.
Daniel Nolan (2006). Vagueness, Multiplicity and Parts. Noûs 40 (4):716–737.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads45 ( #89,120 of 1,790,307 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #123,390 of 1,790,307 )
How can I increase my downloads?