Do species have standing?

Environmental Ethics 9 (1):57-72 (1987)
In arecent article Christopher D. Stone has effectively withdrawn his proposal that natural objects be granted legal rights, in response to criticism from the Feinberg/McCloskey camp. Stone now favors a weaker proposal that natural objects be granted what he calls legal considerateness. I argue that Stone’s retreat is both unnecessary and undesirable. I develop the notion of a de facto legal right and argue that species already have legal rights as statutory beneflciaries of the Endangered Species Act of 1973. I conclude that granting certain nonhuman natural entities legal rights is both more important and less costly than Stone and his critics have realized, and that it is not Stone’s original proposal which needs rethinking, but the concept of interests at work in the Feinberg/McCloskey position
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DOI 10.5840/enviroethics19879114
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