Higher-order vagueness and the vagueness of ‘vague’

Mind 112 (446):295–298 (2003)
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Abstract

R. Sorensen’s argument to the effect that ’vague’ is a vague predicate has been used by D. Hyde to infer that vague predicates suffer from higher-order vagueness. M. Tye has objected (convincingly) that this is too strong: all that follows from Sorensen’s result is that there are some border border cases, but not necessarily border border cases of every vague predicate. I argue that this is still too strong: Sorensen’s proof presupposes the existence of border border cases, hence cannot be used to establish that fact on pain of circularity.

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Achille C. Varzi
Columbia University

Citations of this work

‘Vague’ at Higher Orders.Ivan Hu - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1189-1216.
Betting on borderline cases.Richard Dietz - 2008 - Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):47-88.

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References found in this work

Sense and Sensibilia.John Langshaw Austin - 1962 - Oxford University Press. Edited by G. Warnock.
Sense and Sensibilia.J. L. Austin - 1962 - Oxford University Press USA.
Sense and Sensibilia.[author unknown] - 1962 - Foundations of Language 3 (3):303-310.

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