Modern and postmodern challenges to game theory

Erkenntnis 38 (3):371 - 404 (1993)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Equilibrium game theory borrows from neoclassical economics its rationality concept which it immediately puts to work in order to produce the basic results it needs for building an elaborate narrative of social interaction. This paper focuses on some recent objections to game theory's use of rationality assumptions in general, and of backward induction and subgame perfection in particular, and interprets them in the light of the postmodern critique of the grand meta-narratives which social theorists often rely on for social explanation. The paper presents a defence of game theory which seeks to accommodate the postmodern critique. However, it goes on to show that such a defence is illegitimate and claims that the problem lies with the faulty conceptualisation of the main concept on which game theory rests: that of Reason. Having established the nature of the problem, it considers three alternative interpretations (Humean, postmodern and Hegelian) of why the problem resists logical solutions and of its significance for social theory.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
74 (#201,995)

6 months
3 (#439,386)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

Writing and difference.Jacques Derrida - 1978 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Writing and Difference.Jacques Derrida - 1978 - Chicago: Routledge.
Writing and Difference.Jacques Derrida - 1978 - Chicago: Routledge.
The Post-Modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge.J. F. Lyotard - 1985 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63:520.
The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation.Brian Skyrms - 1990 - Harvard University Press.

View all 12 references / Add more references