David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):330-49 (1995)
This paper responds to the issues raised by D. Chalmers by offering a research direction which is quite radical because of the way in which methodological principles are linked to scientific studies of consciousness. Neuro-phenomenology is the name I use here to designate a quest to marry modern cognitive science and a disciplined approach to human experience, thereby placing myself in the lineage of the continental tradition of Phenomenology. My claim is that the so-called hard problem that animates these Special Issues can only be addressed productively by gathering a research community armed with new pragmatic tools for the development of a science of consciousness. I will claim that no piecemeal empirical correlates, nor purely theoretical principles, will really help us at this stage. We need to turn to a systematic exploration of the only link between mind and consciousness that seems both obvious and natural: the structure of human experience itself.In what follows I motivate my choice by briefly examining the current debate about consciousness at the light of Chalmer’s hard problem. Next, I outline the phenomenological strategy. Finally I conclude by discussing some of the main difficulties and consequences of this strategy
|Keywords||Consciousness Methodology Phenomenology Psychology Science Chalmers, D|
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Citations of this work BETA
Hanne De Jaegher & Ezequiel Di Paolo (2007). Participatory Sense-Making. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):485-507.
Ezequiel A. Di Paolo (2005). Autopoiesis, Adaptivity, Teleology, Agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):429-452.
Simon Høffding & Kristian Martiny (forthcoming). Framing a Phenomenological Interview: What, Why and How. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-26.
Thomas Desmidt, Maël Lemoine, Catherine Belzung & Natalie Depraz (2014). The Temporal Dynamic of Emotional Emergence. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):557-578.
Anthony I. Jack & Andreas Roepstorff (2002). Introspection and Cognitive Brain Mapping: From Stimulus-Response to Script-Report. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (8):333-339.
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