Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem

Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):330-49 (1995)
Abstract
This paper responds to the issues raised by D. Chalmers by offering a research direction which is quite radical because of the way in which methodological principles are linked to scientific studies of consciousness. Neuro-phenomenology is the name I use here to designate a quest to marry modern cognitive science and a disciplined approach to human experience, thereby placing myself in the lineage of the continental tradition of Phenomenology. My claim is that the so-called hard problem that animates these Special Issues can only be addressed productively by gathering a research community armed with new pragmatic tools for the development of a science of consciousness. I will claim that no piecemeal empirical correlates, nor purely theoretical principles, will really help us at this stage. We need to turn to a systematic exploration of the only link between mind and consciousness that seems both obvious and natural: the structure of human experience itself.In what follows I motivate my choice by briefly examining the current debate about consciousness at the light of Chalmer’s hard problem. Next, I outline the phenomenological strategy. Finally I conclude by discussing some of the main difficulties and consequences of this strategy
Keywords Consciousness  Methodology  Phenomenology  Psychology  Science  Chalmers, D
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Shaun Gallagher (2012). Taking Stock of Phenomenology Futures. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (2):304-318.
Natalie Depraz (2012). Empathy and Second-Person Methodology. Continental Philosophy Review 45 (3):447-459.
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