David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Law and Philosophy 28 (6):585-616 (2009)
Central to Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia is a defense of the legitimacy of the minimal state’s use of coercion against anarchist objections. Individuals acting within their natural rights can establish the state without committing wrongdoing against those who disagree. Nozick attempts to show that even with a natural executive right, individuals need not actually consent to incur political obligations. Nozick’s argument relies on an account of compensation to remedy the infringement of the non-consenters’ procedural rights. Compensation, however, cannot remedy the infringement, for either it is superfluous to Nozick’s account of procedural rights, or it is made to play a role inconsistent with Nozick’s liberal voluntarist commitments. Nevertheless, Nozick’s account of procedural rights contains clues for how to solve the problem. Since procedural rights are incompatible with a natural executive right, Nozickeans can argue that only the state can enforce individuals’ rights without wronging anyone, thus refuting the anarchist. Thanks to Annette Dufner, Arnt Myrstad, Arthur Ripstein, Gopal Sreenivasan, James Sterba, Chloe Taylor, Sergio Tenenbaum, and Shelley Weinberg. Thanks also to Matt Zwolinski and Jonelle DePetro, who commented on earlier versions of the paper at the Central APA 2007 and at the 2006 Illinois Philosophical Association Conference (respectively). Finally, thanks to my graduate students at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign for their active engagement with the ideas during a seminar on liberal theories of justice (fall 2007)
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Helga Varden (2009). Nozick's Reply to the Anarchist. Law and Philosophy 28 (6):585 - 616.
Nicolas Maloberti (2010). The Squirrel and the State. The Independent Review 14 (3):377-387.
Randy Barnett (1977). Whither Anarchy? Has Robert Nozick Justified the State? Journal of Libertarian Studies 1 (1):15-21.
Peter Vallentyne (2007). Review of Dale F. Murray, Nozick, Autonomy and Compensation. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (12).
Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Dycus Miller & Jeffrey Paul (eds.) (2005). Natural Rights Liberalism From Locke to Nozick. Cambridge University Press.
Richard J. Arneson (2005). The Shape of Lockean Rights: Fairness, Pareto, Moderation, and Consent. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (1):255-285.
Onora O'Neill (1976). II. Nozick's Entitlements. Inquiry 19 (1-4):468-481.
David Lewis Schaefer (2007). Procedural Versus Substantive Justice: Rawls and Nozick. Social Philosophy and Policy 24 (1):164-186.
John Hasnas (2005). Toward a Theory of Empirical Natural Rights. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (1):111-147.
Charles Sayward & Wayne Wasserman (1981). Has Nozick Justified the State? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62:411-415.
Jeremy Waldron (2005). Nozick and Locke: Filling the Space of Rights. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (1):81-110.
Ralf M. Bader & John Meadowcroft (eds.) (2011). The Cambridge Companion to Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Cambridge University Press.
Added to index2010-11-17
Total downloads22 ( #77,770 of 1,101,075 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #81,070 of 1,101,075 )
How can I increase my downloads?