David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialectica 57 (4):387–412 (2003)
Standard lore has it that a proper name is a temporally rigid designator. It picks out the same entity at every time at which it picks out an entity at all. If the entity in question is an enduring continuant then we know what this means, though we are also stuck with a host of metaphysical puzzles concerning endurance itself. If the entity in question is a perdurant then the rigidity claim is trivial, though one is left wondering how it is that different speakers ever manage to pick out one and the same entity when a host of suitable, overlapping candidates are available. But what if the entity in question is neither a continuant nor a perdurant? What if the things we talk about in ordinary language are time-bound entities that cannot truly be said to persist through time, or stage sequences whose unity resides exclusively in our minds--like the “waves” at the stadium or the characters of a cartoon? In such cases the rigidity claim can’t be right and a counterpart-theoretic semantics seems required. Is that bad? I say it isn’t. And it had better not be, if that turns out to be the best metaphysical option we have.
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
Theodore Sider (2001). Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford University Press.
Timothy Williamson (1994). Vagueness. Routledge.
Katherine Hawley (2001). How Things Persist. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Cody Gilmore, Damiano Costa & Claudio Calosi (2016). Relativity and Three Four‐Dimensionalisms. Philosophy Compass 11 (2):102-120.
Damiano Costa (forthcoming). The Transcendentist Theory of Persistence. Journal of Philosophy.
Jiri Benovsky (2015). Dual‐Aspect Monism. Philosophical Investigations 38 (4).
Jiri Benovsky (2013). The Present Vs. The Specious Present. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):193-203.
Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (2011). Can Persistence Be a Matter of Convention? Axiomathes 21 (4):507-529.
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