David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 37 (1):189-246 (2010)
As historically acknowledged in the Reasoning about Actions and Change community, intuitiveness of a logical domain description cannot be fully automated. Moreover, like any other logical theory, action theories may also evolve, and thus knowledge engineers need revision methods to help in accommodating new incoming information about the behavior of actions in an adequate manner. The present work is about changing action domain descriptions in multimodal logic. Its contribution is threefold: first we revisit the semantics of action theory contraction proposed in previous work, giving more robust operators that express minimal change based on a notion of distance between Kripke-models. Second we give algorithms for syntactical action theory contraction and establish their correctness with respect to our semantics for those action theories that satisfy a principle of modularity investigated in previous work. Since modularity can be ensured for every action theory and, as we show here, needs to be computed at most once during the evolution of a domain description, it does not represent a limitation at all to the method here studied. Finally we state AGM-like postulates for action theory contraction and assess the behavior of our operators with respect to them. Moreover, we also address the revision counterpart of action theory change, showing that it benefits from our semantics for contraction.
|Keywords||Reasoning about Actions Belief Change Modal Logic|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Ivan Varzinczak (2006). What Is a Good Domain Description? Evaluating and Revising Action Theories in Dynamic Logic. Dissertation, Université Paul Sabatier
Andreas Herzig & Ivan Varzinczak (2007). Metatheory of Actions: Beyond Consistency. Artificial Intelligence 171 (1):951–984.
Mark Jago (2006). Resource-Bounded Belief Revision and Contraction. In P. Torroni, U. Endriss, M. Baldoni & A. Omicini (eds.), Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies III. Springer. 141--154.
Churn-Jung Liau (2001). A Logical Analysis of the Relationship Between Commitment and Obligation. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 10 (2):237-261.
Thomas Andreas Meyer, Willem Adrian Labuschagne & Johannes Heidema (2000). Infobase Change: A First Approximation. [REVIEW] Journal of Logic, Language and Information 9 (3):353-377.
Chitta Baral & Nam Tran (2005). Representation and Reasoning About Evolutions of the World in the Context of Reasoning About Actions. Studia Logica 79 (1):33 - 46.
Gregory Wheeler & Marco Alberti (2011). NO Revision and NO Contraction. Minds and Machines 21 (3):411-430.
David Makinson (1985). How to Give It Up: A Survey of Some Formal Aspects of the Logic of Theory Change. Synthese 62 (3):347 - 363.
David Makinson (1986). How to Give It Up: A Survey of Some Formal Aspects of the Logic of Theory Change. Synthese 68 (1):185 - 186.
Oliver Schulte (1999). Minimal Belief Change and the Pareto Principle. Synthese 118 (3):329-361.
Dongmo Zhang & Norman Foo (2001). Infinitary Belief Revision. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):525-570.
Eduardo L. Fermé (1998). On the Logic of Theory Change: Contraction Without Recovery. [REVIEW] Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7 (2):127-137.
Abhaya C. Nayak (1994). Foundational Belief Change. Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (5):495 - 533.
Added to index2011-04-01
Total downloads17 ( #80,536 of 1,004,684 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #28,177 of 1,004,684 )
How can I increase my downloads?