Philosophy and the Folk: On Some Implications of Experimental Work For Philosophical Debates on Free Will
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1):239-254 (2006)
I discuss experimental work by Nichols, and Nichols and Knobe, with respect to the philosophical problems of free will and moral responsibility. I mention some methodological concerns about the work, but focus principally on the philosophical implications of the work. The experimental results seem to show that in particular, concrete cases we are more willing to attribute responsibility than in cases described abstractly or in general terms. I argue that their results suggest a deep problem for traditional accounts of compatibilism, and that they may cast some light on the literature surrounding Frankfurt cases. I also suggest a way in which mature philosophical convictions about free will may reflect a contingent process of refining and defending either of two competing strands of intuitions, and suggest that this may partly explain the persistence of philosophical debates about free will.
|Keywords||Experimental Philosophy Free Will Shaun Nichols Moral Responsibility Folk beliefs|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Florian Cova, Maxime Bertoux, Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde & Bruno Dubois (2012). Judgments About Moral Responsibility and Determinism in Patients with Behavioural Variant of Frontotemporal Dementia: Still Compatibilists. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):851-864.
Derk Pereboom (2009). Hard Incompatibilism and its Rivals. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):21 - 33.
Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely (2009). Do Judgments About Freedom and Responsibility Depend on Who You Are? Personality Differences in Intuitions About Compatibilism and Incompatibilism. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):342-350.
Similar books and articles
Tamler Sommers (2010). Experimental Philosophy and Free Will. Philosophy Compass 5 (2):199-212.
Shaun Nichols (2004). The Folk Psychology of Free Will: Fits and Starts. Mind and Language 19 (5):473-502.
Shaun Nichols (2006). Folk Intuitions on Free Will. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6:57-86.
Eddy Nahmias, D. Justin Coates & Trevor Kvaran (2007). Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mechanism: Experiments on Folk Intuitions. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):214–242.
Jason Turner & Eddy A. Nahmias (2006). Are the Folk Agent-Causationists? Mind and Language 21 (5):597-609.
Shaun Nichols (2006). Free Will and the Folk: Responses to Commentators. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6:305-320.
Eddy A. Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner (2005). Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions About Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561-584.
Sharmistha Dhar (2009). Compatibilism Vs. Incompatibilism: An Integrated Approach From Participant Stance and Affect. Logos Architekton 3 (1):247-269.
Eddy A. Nahmias (2006). Folk Fears About Freedom and Responsibility: Determinism Vs. Reductionism. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):215-237.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads117 ( #6,585 of 1,089,063 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #20,075 of 1,089,063 )
How can I increase my downloads?