David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2):249-265 (2009)
I consider some themes and issues arising in recent work on moral responsibility, focusing on three recent books—Carlos Moya’s Moral Responsibility, Al Mele’s Free Will and Luck, and John Martin Fischer’s My Way. I argue that these texts collectively suggest some difficulties with the way in which many issues are currently framed in the free will debates, including disputes about what constitutes compatibilism and incompatibilism and the relevance of intuitions and ordinary language for describing the metaphysics of free will and moral responsibility. I also argue that each of the accounts raise more particular puzzles: it is unclear to what extent Moya’s account is properly an account of free will; Mele’s account raises questions about the significance of luck for compatibilist theories; and Fischer’s account of the value of responsibility as self-expression raises questions about the normative significance of moral responsibility.
|Keywords||MORAL RESPONSIBILITY MOYA MELE FREE WILL LUCK LIBERTARIANISM FISCHER SEMICOMPATIBILISM|
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Manuel Vargas (2012). Why the Luck Problem Isn't. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):419-436.
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