David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophic Exchange 40:56-78 (2010)
There is a familiar chain of reasoning that goes something like this: if everything is caused, no one is free, and thus, no one can be morally responsible. Reasoning like this has made scientific explanations of human behavior (e.g., biology, psychology, and neuroscience) threatening to familiar ideas of responsibility, blameworthiness, and merit. Rather than directly attacking the chain of reasoning that gives rise to these worries, I explore an alternative approach, one that begins by considering the "use" of moral responsibility. What role does the concept play for us? What structure, if any, would an ideal set of practices and attitudes about moral responsibility have to it? I outline a new account of responsibility and consider what it might mean for traditional worries about causal, scientific explanations of human behavior.
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Manuel Vargas (2005). The Revisionist's Guide to Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 125 (3):399-429.
Manuel Vargas (2004). Responsibility and the Aims of Theory: Strawson and Revisionism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2):218-241.
John Martin Fischer (2006). My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
Matthew Talbert (2011). Unwitting Behavior and Responsibility. Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (1):139-152.
Manuel Vargas (2006). On the Importance of History for Responsible Agency. Philosophical Studies 127 (3):351-382.
Marion Smiley (1992). Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community. University of Chicago Press.
Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (2013). A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):611-639.
John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press.
Dan Simbotin (2008). About the Needlessness of the Verb “To Be”. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 15:231-236.
John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (eds.) (1993). Perspectives on Moral Responsibility. Cornell University Press.
Manuel Vargas (forthcoming). Situationism and Moral Responsibility: Free Will in Fragments. In Tillman Vierkant, Julian Kiverstein & Andy Clark (eds.), Decomposing the Will. Oxford UP.
Gan Hun Ahn (2008). An Analysis of Semi-Compatibilism. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 15:7-12.
Kenton Machina (2007). Moral Responsibility—What is All the Fuss About? Acta Analytica 22 (1):29-47.
Added to index2010-12-22
Total downloads37 ( #46,151 of 1,100,932 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #80,918 of 1,100,932 )
How can I increase my downloads?