David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Tillman Vierkant, Julian Kiverstein & Andy Clark (eds.), Decomposing the Will. Oxford UP (forthcoming)
Many prominent accounts of free <span class='Hi'>will</span> and moral responsibility make use of the idea that agents can be responsive to reasons. Call such theories Reasons accounts. In what follows, I consider the tenability of Reasons accounts in light of situationist social psychology and, to a lesser extent, the automaticity literature. In the ﬁrst half of this chapter, I argue that Reasons accounts are genuinely threatened by contemporary psychology. In the second half of the paper I consider whether such threats can be met, and at what cost. Ultimately, I argue that Reasons accounts can abandon some familiar assumptions, and that doing so permits us to build a more empirically plausible picture of our agency.
|Keywords||Situationism Free Will Moral Responsibility Revisionism Dispositionalism Conditional Analysis|
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Victoria McGeer (2015). Building a Better Theory of Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2635-2649.
Tillmann Vierkant & Rosa Hardt (2015). Explicit Reasons, Implicit Stereotypes and the Effortful Control of the Mind. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):251-265.
Vishnu Sridharan (2014). Rational Action and Moral Ownership. Neuroethics 7 (2):195-203.
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