Strict Identity with No Overlap

Studia Logica 82 (3):371-378 (2006)
It is common lore that standard, Kripke-style semantics for quantified modal logic is incompatible with the view that no individual may belong to more than one possible world, a view that seems to require a counterpart-theoretic semantics instead. Strictly speaking, however, this thought is wrong-headed. This note explains why.
Keywords Quantified Modal Logic  Identity  Counterpart Theory
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DOI 10.2307/20016790
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PhilPapers Archive Achille C. Varzi, Strict Identity with No Overlap
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References found in this work BETA
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.
Saul A. Kripke (1963). Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic. Acta Philosophica Fennica 16 (1963):83-94.

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