Strict identity with no overlap
Studia Logica 82 (3):371 - 378 (2006)
| Abstract | It is common lore that standard, Kripke-style semantics for quantified modal logic is incompatible with the view that no individual may belong to more than one possible world, a view that seems to require a counterpart-theoretic semantics instead. Strictly speaking, however, this thought is wrong-headed. This note explains why. | |||||||||
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