David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Studia Logica 82 (3):371-378 (2006)
It is common lore that standard, Kripke-style semantics for quantified modal logic is incompatible with the view that no individual may belong to more than one possible world, a view that seems to require a counterpart-theoretic semantics instead. Strictly speaking, however, this thought is wrong-headed. This note explains why.
|Keywords||Quantified Modal Logic Identity Counterpart Theory|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Alessandro Torza (2013). How to Lewis a Kripke-Hintikka. Synthese 190 (4):743-779.
Similar books and articles
Fabrice Correia (2001). Priorean Strict Implication, Q and Related Systems. Studia Logica 69 (3):411-427.
Alberto Voltolini (1997). Contingent and Necessary Identities. Acta Analytica 19:73-98.
Christopher Hughes (2004). Kripke: Names, Necessity, and Identity. Oxford University Press.
Andrew Bacon (forthcoming). Representing Counterparts. Australasian Journal of Logic.
Edwin D. Mares (1992). Semantics for Relevance Logic with Identity. Studia Logica 51 (1):1 - 20.
Robert Goldblatt (2011). Quantifiers, Propositions, and Identity: Admissible Semantics for Quantified Modal and Substructural Logics. Cambridge University Press.
Robert Kirk (1982). Physicalism, Identity, and Strict Implication. Ratio 24 (December):131-41.
Thomas Sattig (2008). Identity in 4d. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):179 - 195.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads16 ( #104,305 of 1,102,965 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #183,254 of 1,102,965 )
How can I increase my downloads?