David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In André Chapuis & Anil Gupta (eds.), Circularity, Definition, and Truth. Indian Council of Philosophical Research 365-370 (2000)
Classically, truth and falsehood are opposite, and so are logical truth and logical falsehood. In this paper we imagine a situation in which the opposition is so pervasive in the language we use as to threaten the very possibility of telling truth from falsehood. The example exploits a suggestion of Ramsey’s to the effect that negation can be expressed simply by writing the negated sentence upside down. The difference between ‘p’ and ‘~~p’ disappears, the principle of double negation becomes trivial, and the truth/falsehood opposition is up for grabs. Our moral is that this indeterminacy undermines the idea of inferential role semantics.
|Keywords||Truth Falsity Negation Inferential role semantics|
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Citations of this work BETA
Roy A. Sorensen (1999). Mirror Notation: Symbol Manipulation Without Inscription Manipulation. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (2):141-164.
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