The revisionist's guide to responsibility

Philosophical Studies 125 (3):399-429 (2005)
Revisionism in the theory of moral responsibility is the idea that some aspect of responsibility practices, attitudes, or concept is in need of revision. While the increased frequency of revisionist language in the literature on free will and moral responsibility is striking, what discussion there has been of revisionism about responsibility and free will tends to be critical. In this paper, I argue that at least one species of revisionism, moderate revisionism, is considerably more sophisticated and defensible than critics have realized. I go on to argue for the advantages of moderate revisionist theories over standard compatibilist and incompatibilist theories
Keywords Error  Free Will  Metaphysics  Responsibility  Revisionism
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Manuel Vargas (2005). The Trouble with Tracing. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):269–291.

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