David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 125 (3):399-429 (2005)
Revisionism in the theory of moral responsibility is the idea that some aspect of responsibility practices, attitudes, or concept is in need of revision. While the increased frequency of revisionist language in the literature on free will and moral responsibility is striking, what discussion there has been of revisionism about responsibility and free will tends to be critical. In this paper, I argue that at least one species of revisionism, moderate revisionism, is considerably more sophisticated and defensible than critics have realized. I go on to argue for the advantages of moderate revisionist theories over standard compatibilist and incompatibilist theories.
|Keywords||Error Free Will Metaphysics Responsibility Revisionism|
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Eddy Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner (2006). Is Incompatibilism Intuitive? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28 - 53.
Florian Cova, Maxime Bertoux, Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde & Bruno Dubois (2012). Judgments About Moral Responsibility and Determinism in Patients with Behavioural Variant of Frontotemporal Dementia: Still Compatibilists. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):851-864.
John M. Doris, Joshua Knobe & Robert L. Woolfolk (2007). Variantism About Responsibility. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):183–214.
Adam Feltz & Florian Cova (2014). Moral Responsibility and Free Will: A Meta-Analysis. Consciousness and Cognition 30:234-246.
Manuel Vargas (2005). The Trouble with Tracing. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):269–291.
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