The vagueness of ‘vague’: Rejoinder to Hull

Mind 114 (455):695-702 (2005)
A rejoinder to G. Hull’s reply to my Mind 2003. Hull argues that Sorensen’s purported proof that ‘vague’ is vague--which I defended against certain familiar objections--fails. He offers three reasons: (i) the vagueness exhibited by Sorensen’s sorites is just the vagueness of ‘small’; (ii) the general assumption underlying the proof, to the effect that predicates which possess borderline cases are vague, is mistaken; (iii) the conclusion of the proof is unacceptable, for it is possible to create Sorensen-type sorites even for predicates that are paradigmatically precise. I argue that each of these points involves fallacious reasoning.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzi695
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