Why the luck problem isn't

Philosophical Issues 22 (1):419-436 (2012)
Abstract
The Luck Problem has existed in one form or another since David Hume, at least. It is perhaps as old as Stoic objections to the Epicurean swerve. Although the general issue admits of different formulations with subtly different emphases, the characterization of it that will serve as my target focuses on “cross-worlds” luck, a kind of luck that arises when the decision-making of agents is indeterministic
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References found in this work BETA
Bernard Berofsky (2000). Ultimate Responsibility in a Deterministic World. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):135-40.

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