Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):557–569 (2004)
|Abstract||Gilbert Harman has presented an argument to the effect that if S knows that p then S knows that any evidence for not-p is misleading. Therefore S is warranted in being dogmatic about anything he happens to know. I explain, and reject, Sorensen's attempt to solve the paradox via Jackson's theory of conditionals. S is not in a position to disregard evidence even when he knows it to be misleading|
|Keywords||paradox dogmatism junk knowledge|
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