Hallucinations for disjunctivists

Abstract
In this paper, I examine the so-called disjunctive views on hallucinations. I argue that neither of the options open to the disjunctivist is capable of accommodating basic phenomenological facts about hallucinatory experiences and the explanatory demands behind the classical argument from hallucination. A positive characterization of the hallucinatory case is not attractive to a disjunctivist once she is disposed to accept certain commonalities with veridical experiences. Negative disjunctivism glosses the hallucinatory disjunct in terms of indiscriminability. I will argue that this move either renounces to characterize phenomenally the hallucinatory experience or does not take seriously questions about why indiscriminability is possible in the phenomenal realm.
Keywords Hallucination  Disjunctivism  Phenomenal character  Indiscriminability  (Non)-relationality
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-010-9155-1
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References found in this work BETA
Michael G. F. Martin (2004). The Limits of Self-Awareness. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.
Michael G. F. Martin (2006). On Being Alienated. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press

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Citations of this work BETA
Boyd Millar (2014). The Phenomenological Problem of Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):625-654.

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Similar books and articles
Katalin Farkas (2014). A Sense of Reality. In Fiona MacPherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucinations. MIT Press 399-417.
Fabian Dorsch (2013). Experience and Introspection. In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination. The MIT Press 175-220.
Michael G. F. Martin (2006). On Being Alienated. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press
Susanna Siegel (2008). The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press 205--224.
William Fish, Disjunctivism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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